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Medical Ethics and the Nazi War Data
Kristen Zeppenfeld
Cedarville University
During World War II, many horrific occurrences took place on German soil. Prior to the outbreak
of war, the Nazi regime had taken control of the country and had embarked on a mission to
cleanse the world of “unworthy life.” Failing to recognize the basic human rights of Jews and
several other groups, the Nazis imprisoned, euthanized, or exploited them as subjects for medical
experiments.
The conditions in which such experimentation took place were heinous and inhumane. In one
such experiment:
. . . The experimental subjects were placed in the water, dressed in complete flying
uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made
out of rubber kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were carried out at
water temperatures varying from 2.5 to 12 Centigrade. In one experimental series, the
occiput (brain stem) protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments the
occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water (TWC, 1953).

The absolute horror and repugnance associated with these actions did not go unanswered; the
Nuremburg Military Tribunals held from 1946-1947 resulted in imprisonment and execution for
many of the officials involved.
Although these incidents took place more than half a century ago and ended in some justice, they
still create ethical dilemmas to this day. The medical experiments carried out by the Nazis were
unprecedented, and (of course) such research could never be repeated. The results of these
experiments are still in existence and have the potential to serve a greater purpose.
However, is it ethical to use knowledge that was obtained without consent and amidst gruesome
conditions for the betterment of medical research today?
In facing this question, many people immediately assume that the only way for any good to come
out of such tragedy is to allow the results to be published and used. “. . . [We] should [not] let the
inhumanity of the experiments blind us to the possibility that some good may be salvaged from
the ashes” (Moe, 1984, p. 7). In fact, a number of writers have already used this data to back up
their research. By 1984, at least forty-five articles had been published drawing upon data
obtained from the Nazi experimentation (Moe, 1984).
In stark opposition to such arguments, opponents argue that such research should not be used for
a number of reasons. They feel that “. . . the evil of the Nazi atrocities has infused [it]” such that
the data itself is evil (Quinn, 2000, p. 317). They also feel that citing the data will in some way
legitimize the actions of the Nazi doctors. In addition, they argue that a refusal to use it will deter
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future researchers from committing similar wrongs (Quinn, 2000). For these people, the lack of
morality in the experimentation removes all value from the data.

While arguments from both sides may seem legitimate, I believe the use of the Nazi research is
wrong based solely on the nature and requirements of morally superogatory deeds. As pointed
out by Quinn, no one ever raises the question of whether the use of the data is in fact harming the
victims (2000). If one takes into consideration the moral levels of duty, there may indeed be
direct harm to them or their descendants.
Ethics is commonly defined as the moral response to various situations. Every person is morally
responsible for his or her own actions, assuming freedom of action is permitted. People are not
held morally accountable for their inability to do something they cannot do, nor are they held
morally accountable when they do something that they are forced to do.
Ethicists commonly recognize three levels of moral duty. Actions are defined as morally
permissible when they are neither mandated nor forbidden. Morally obligatory deeds are those
which either must be done or must be avoided. Finally, morally superogatory deeds are those that
go beyond what duty demands, and may involve personal cost or sacrifice. A more common way
to describe a person performing such actions is to call him or her a “hero.” Morally superogatory
deeds result from a personal choice and cannot be forced upon an individual by another.
Those who think the Nazi research should be used are driven by a desire to bring about
something good from evil circumstances. But by striving to gain from the victims’ suffering,
society forces them to take on a superogatory role. These people were experimental subjects not
by choice but by force. They did not choose to give their bodies for the furtherance of medical
research, but rather had their bodies taken from them for that purpose.
These people were robbed of their dignity at the hands of evil men. It is therefore my belief that
society should stop the wrong they are committing in seeking to gain from their loss. Upholding
and maintaining the utmost respect for these individuals is expected, so it is wrong for
researchers to demand access to data from their abuse and torture, even for the good of society.
Such usage removes their ability to choose heroism on their own part, and causes further
exploitation of the victims.
Society should not hold those forced into an action to provide a benefit to society. Just as moral
responsibility is contingent upon freedom of action, so too should moral duty be based on the
same freedom.
“. . . Every part of civilization is built upon past knowledge, whether it is positive or negative in
our eyes” (Weitzman, 1990, p. 26). Our knowledge of the horrors of the Nazi experimentation
and dehumanization should be used in order to recognize evils which current research must
avoid. The data gained through these unthinkable situations should be laid to rest, just as the
exploited victims have been.
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